Right to food, right to mine? Competing human rights claims in Bangladesh  by Bedi, Heather Plumridge
Geoforum 59 (2015) 248–257Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /geoforumRight to food, right to mine? Competing human rights claims
in Bangladeshhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.08.015
0016-7185/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
E-mail address: bedih@dickinson.eduHeather Plumridge Bedi
Dickinson College, Environmental Studies Department, PO Box 1773, Carlisle, PA 17013, USAa r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 7 October 2013
Received in revised form 15 August 2014
Available online 30 September 2014
Keywords:
Mining
Right to food
Human rights
Corporate social responsibility
Bangladesh
United Nations Special Rapporteursa b s t r a c t
The right to food is increasingly evoked by a range of actors, but there is not sufﬁcient critical analysis of
distinct interpretations of what this right means in practice. Through examination of a mineral extraction
project with agricultural implications, this article explores diverse human rights narratives and illumi-
nates associated corporate efforts to minimize recognition of food as a fundamental right. A British min-
ing company proposes the Phulbari open pit coal mine in an agriculturally important region of
Bangladesh. Highly contested by affected populations, clashes in 2006 between the police and protestors
turned deadly in the area. In February 2012, a group of UN Special Rapporteurs cautioned the Govern-
ment of Bangladesh regarding human rights violations associated with the planned mine. They warned
that the project would displace hundreds of thousands of people, while destroying fertile agricultural
land. In contrast, an ongoing publicity campaign by the corporation attempts to promote their interven-
tion as a positive step, fully compliant with international human rights and corporate social responsibility
standards. Taking this case as an exemplar, the article illuminates the pursuit of mining proﬁt and the
distinct use of human rights narratives by corporations and UN Special Rapporteurs. These diverse actors
represent the layering of voices weighing in on mineral extraction and associated right to food concerns.
Collectively, these layered narratives represent a new terrain for the promotion and contestation of min-
ing and highlight the need to scrutinize mining practices in light of social responsibility and human rights
claims being voluntary and self-regulated.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).Valuing coal versus agriculture
‘‘Coal under the ground is worth more than growing rice on the
surface’’.
[– Gary Lye, Executive Director of GCM Resources (Melik, 2006)]
Corporate plans to displace 50,000 to 220,000people for theGCM
Resources Phulbari coal mine in Bangladesh are premised on the
above economic valuation concerning themineral extraction of coal,
or the harvesting of rice for food. The question here is valuable to
whom? Are economic gains to be prioritized over the food rights
of people in an agriculturally vulnerable region of Bangladesh, a
country with persistent malnutrition (Shahabuddin, 2010)? Similar
economic arguments are commonly made to justify displacement
and land alienation for lucrative mining projects (Moody, 2007;
Bebbington, 2009; Bedi, 2013a). Others contend that the issue is
more complex thaneconomics suggest, and respond to the proposed
mine in myriad ways, including critiques framed around food inse-
curity or the injustice of extracting coal for export. These distinctnarratives are dynamically inﬂuenced by one another, and create a
contested and layered terrain to defend or oppose the mine. This
paper predominantly highlights how United Nations (UN) Special
Rapporteurs frame the issue in relation to human rights,with partic-
ular emphasis on the right to food.
Food sovereignty, food security and the right to food are
increasingly the subjects of international debates, scholarship
and media attention (Dreze, 2013; Monsalve Suarez, 2012;
Lappé, 2011; Giménez and Shattuck, 2011; Patel, 2009; Rosset,
2008). Despite the current interest in these issues, gaps remain
in related literature. Missing from emerging scholarship are the
complex ways that the human right to food is evoked or ignored
in relation to corporate interventions. Through examination of a
mineral extraction project with agricultural implications in Ban-
gladesh, this research explores diverse interpretations of human
rights and associated corporate efforts to ignore or down-play
the importance of food as a fundamental right, while emphasizing
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Analysis of the human rights
implications of a large-scale mining project provides a lens to
examine corporate projects and related development and food
ramiﬁcations for affected populations. Highlighting the layering
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tions, UN actors, diplomats and government business representa-
tives, it is possible to reﬂect on how these narratives alter the
terrains of corporate interventions. How the right to food is evoked
by rapporteurs, but not by the corporation or diplomats alludes to
broader tensions related to the implications of mining and corpo-
rate practice.
The right to food is outlined in various international binding
and nonbinding human rights obligations (Mechlem, 2004: 637).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights deﬁnes
the right to food as ‘‘the right of everyone to have physical and eco-
nomic access at all times to food in adequate quantity and quality
and to means of its procurement’’ (CESCR, 1999: 54). The United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights conﬁrms that ‘‘everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, hous-
ing’’. Increasingly, communities threatened by food and land alien-
ation related to interventions by companies, foreign and domestic
states and institutions, reference the UN Human Rights system
(Monsalve Suarez, 2012: 5). They are not alone in articulating con-
cerns from a rights perspective.
In fact, the UN system designated the ﬁrst rapporteur on the
right to food in 2000. Under the Special Procedures of the Human
Rights Council, UN Special Rapporteurs or working groups are
appointed for particular mandates, including the monitoring and
publicizing of thematically categorized human rights violations
at a global scale or country-speciﬁc violations.1 To illustrate an
intervention in the right to food debate, this article analyzes a pro-
posed mining project in Bangladesh and the diverse ways that the
corporate proposer and rapporteurs reﬂect on the human rights
aspects of the mine. This study precedes imminent ﬁeldwork that
will investigate these dynamics on the ground. Acknowledging the
complicated history of food in Bangladesh, future research will
examine local narratives of resistance and the politics of food.2 The
material presented is based on interviews with activists and aca-
demics, and document analysis of Bangladesh media resources and
reports by the UN, Governments, civil society and the mining corpo-
ration. I draw from rapporteur and corporate statements as ‘‘forms of
claim-making. . .which frame the world in a particular way, propa-
gating various messages and moralities while editing out others’’
(Gardner, 2012: 6). This research engages with the public language
used by the mining company to promote the mine, including CSR
and human rights narratives. Their interpretation of human rights
allows for the promotion of their commercial mining interests. In
contrast, the rapporteurs frame the proposed project as a threat to
food security and human rights. These distinct interpretations of
mining demonstrate how CSR may be used as a tool to assert the lan-
guage of rights, and to justify a project which may be detrimental to
vulnerable populations and places.
I begin with a review of the interplay between corporations,
development, extraction and the state, in particular in relation to
critiques of corporate social responsibility. Next, I detail the human
rights approaches adopted by the UN, incorporating the mandate
of the rapporteurs. I examine how the rapporteurs critiqued the
proposed mine using a human rights framework. In contrast, the
mine proposer questions the rapporteurs’ conclusions and1 Currently, there are 36 thematic and 12 country rapporteurs (Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a,b). While unpaid, the rapporteurs receive
logistical and personnel support from the Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. Typically, the rapporteurs receive reports of human rights violations and seek
information from governments regarding the detailed abuses. The UN reports that in
2011 their human rights mandates sent 605 such communications to 131 Govern-
ments, with almost three-quarters of the statements jointly authored by multiple
rapporteurs (Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a,b).
2 It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the historical usage of ideas of food
security in Bangladesh.counters that their practices adhere to voluntary human rights
standards. This difference reveals tensions in how human rights
and CSR are theorized and applied by diverse actors with varying
levels of power to enact change or harm. Through this review of
the micro-politics of a corporate proposal (Dolan and Rajak,
2011), the project promoter appears to prioritize the economic bot-
tom line over the protection of fundamental rights. This contrast
provides the opportunity to review broader global mining practices
and project justiﬁcations shrouded in CSR language. The generic
application of corporate responsibility standards across diverse
places and people does not account for distinct contextual factors
which may deem the most well intended CSR approach inappropri-
ate or irrelevant. I propose this review as an opportunity to move
beyond the application of legitimizing CSR narratives for any
extraction project to a broader questioning of where mining is
incompatible with the protection of human rights.Actors and development justiﬁcations: corporate social
responsibility and extraction
As corporations adopt a language of social responsibility as part
of their ‘license to operate’, market-based approaches to develop-
ment goals gain prominence. The concept of corporate social
responsibility centers on corporate led initiatives to emphasize
dialogue and voluntary action beyond the regulatory mechanisms
of the state (Utting, 2008). CSR narratives have become a main-
stream aspect of contemporary corporate ‘‘social’’ considerations,
distinguished from CSR practices. The CSR movement has success-
fully framed itself as a solution in the face of social resistance and
environmental conﬂict related to global corporate practice (Dolan
and Rajak, 2011: 3). A gap, however, remains in scholarly work
regarding the meaning, practices and contestations of these corpo-
rate engagements. In particular, the agency of transnational corpo-
rations should be problematized beyond simplistic ideas of
globalization (Kearns, 2008), and the human rights implications
of their interventions detailed.
The promotion of corporate-led development and economic
models changes the role of the state, and how the state is experi-
enced everyday by citizens. For example, in liberalizing India the
state is central in acquiring agricultural land for corporate use
(Sud, 2009). The Indian state is viewed by some as a proxy for cor-
porate land interests, and is described by some activists as a linked
corporate-state nexus (Bedi, 2013b). Similarly, to make lands avail-
able for a shrimp Special Economic Zone the Bangladesh state ‘‘used
its prerogative of eminent domain to acquire these peasant holdings
against their wishes, making such lands available in the ﬁrst place
to private interest groups’’ (Adnan, 2013: 117). Associated disen-
franchisement across landscapes derives from the reality that other
state or society aspirations may be bypassed through the promo-
tion of a stable corporate climate. Related dispossession of people
displaced or denied services are justiﬁed as a cost of progress. The
associated inequities are not without contestation, witnessed by
resistance against capital fuelledmodernization (Harvey, 2006: 72).
The capacity of corporations to fulﬁll demands generally attrib-
uted to nation-states, including governance requirements or meet-
ing the livelihood, food and employment needs of the poor remains
underdeveloped. Despite this, there has been a growing case made
since the early 2000s for perceiving corporations as well positioned
to address the needs of the poor as laborers, traders and consumers
(Prahalad, 2006). Paradoxically, however, while states have the
theoretical obligation to protect against human rights abuses by
other entities, including corporations, in practice, the responsibil-
ity for safeguards falls on corporations with limited third party
oversight. The enabling roles of nation-states in these debates need
to be interrogated, particularly in relation to corporate involvement.
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to encourage or contest corporate social responsibility.
A cornerstone of Koﬁ Annan’s tenure as UN Secretary-General,
the UN Global Compact outlines ten human rights, labor, environ-
ment and anti-corruption principles that corporations should
adhere to. Rather than corporate regulation, the Compact relies
upon a ‘learning networks’ approach to encourage CSR. Critics have
balked that the Compact is ‘bluewash’ which allows a corporation
to adopt a ‘‘do no harm’’ stance while it ‘‘drape(s) itself in the UN
ﬂag without really mending its ways’’ (Ruggie, 2002: 4,28). The
‘voluntary’ nature of the principles is further contradictory, as it
incorporates human rights principles that are legally obligatory
(Stephens, 2002: 80).
The ability of corporations to undertake a no harm approach is
contested, as in practice corporate ‘amorality’ and lack of personal
accountability enable these entities to engage in harmful practices
without moral misgivings. Further, CSR engagements respond to
and inform politics and power relations in particular geographical
contexts (Haalboom, 2012: 969). The principle of proﬁt maximiza-
tion is legally central to corporations bound to their shareholders,
which undertake a morally neutral pursuit of this proﬁt (Stephens,
2002). Corporations have an ambiguous, amoral status. They are
legally deﬁned as persons, but not ascribed moral agency, and
expected to maximize shareholder proﬁt. This allows for a lack of
accountability or personal responsibility, as the diversity of actors
from shareholders to board of directors enables individuals to shed
their responsibility for the human rights implications of their cor-
porate interventions. CSR conceptually and in practice attempts to
marry opposing goals:
The discourse and practice of CSR attempts to standardize, cat-
egorize, measure, and routinize different forms of value (eco-
nomic, ethical, legal) in supposedly ‘‘win–win’’ marriage of
social and commercial objectives that works for all parties
involved, even those with apparently conﬂicting interests.
[Dolan and Rajak, 2011: 6]
Although homogenizing CSR across distinct places, corporations
wield global clout, power and inﬂuence policy. CSR as a tool to jus-
tify projects at odds with the human rights of those impacted is not
a new phenomenon. Contemporarily noteworthy is the range of
actors either encouraging or contesting CSR justiﬁcations in rela-
tion to human rights and related reconﬁgurations of the state. Mul-
tiple layers of mediation by non-state actors and others, from civil
society organizations to corporations, muddle state-centric visions
of world affairs and practices of extraction. Select actors intention-
ally draw from a rights framework to forewarn possible or current
violations associated with food loss and displacement in particular
cases, including recently in Bangladesh. Resistance articulated by
these individuals, groups and movements provide a new form
and level of pressure and accountability for both corporations
and governments promoting large-scale projects with land and
food implications, albeit with limitations.
These actors alter the landscape for practices of extraction,
prominently with mining in developing countries. This terrain
dynamically evolves in contexts shaped by economic and
development models which can lead to new positioning of the
state in relation to corporations. This activism represents the
growing importance of actors beyond the nation-state globally,
particularly in relation to corporate claims of social responsibility
that are frequently voluntary principles outside of the purview of
national regulation and subsequently self-reported, as will be
examined.
The CSR framework can serve as a hook for affected communi-
ties, social movements and/or transnational networks to stake
their claims for rights accountable corporate practice, with or
without state human rights recognition (Haalboom, 2012: 969).Through this perspective, it is possible to tease apart the
‘‘progressive possibilities of the present, [where] non-state and
non-violence play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the modern world
order’’ (Kearns, 2008: 1601). However, the narratives of contesta-
tion or legitimization used by diverse actors, from activists to
rapporteurs to communities to corporations, are disparate and
allude to different visions of rights and responsibilities.
The range of mining companies adopting CSR language dem-
onstrates the endurance and spread of these concepts, while
underlying the place speciﬁc issues and actors which ultimately
shape how the corporate narratives are received, responded to
and potentially altered. Attributed to liberalizing economies and
resource depletion in developed countries, mining companies
increasingly look to developing countries for extraction opportu-
nities (Kapelus, 2002: 277). This shift has been accompanied by
enhanced scrutiny of mining companies operating in developing
countries, and their subsequent adaptation of northern CSR strat-
egies to continue or expand extraction (Jenkins, 2004). The desire
of mining companies and their Public Relations managers to
aggressively promote CSR policies and programs leads Kapelus
(2002: 279) to conclude that the CSR global agenda has become
a ‘‘business in its own right’’.
Keenly aware of the tendency for the mining company to be
portrayed as an entity that ‘‘lurks monolithically and often menac-
ingly in the background of many anthropological accounts of com-
munities affected by mining operations’’ (Ballard and Banks, 2003:
290), it is instructive to reviewmessier interpretations of corporate
interventions. Focused on mining in Papua New Guinea, Banks
(2006) details how communities and miners interface with sus-
tainability discourses espoused by companies, and cautions against
extremes in characterizing the social implications of extraction.
Betwixt the binaries of ‘‘corporate imperialism’’ and corporations
oblivious to human rights violations associated with their opera-
tions, lies a space that is dynamic where mining corporations inﬂu-
ence, but also adapt in response to the social circumstances on the
ground (Banks, 2006: 271).
These ideas will be reviewed and explored through the example
of the Phulbari mine in Bangladesh, introduced in the following
section. Through analysis of the various statements of condemna-
tion and justiﬁcation for the mine, there is an opportunity to
understand corporate projects, mining and food in Bangladesh
and beyond. The complex role of UN rapporteurs and inﬂecting
relations between nation-states and corporations and implications
for people’s access to food are analyzed. The mine remains in pro-
posal stage, and analysis of the narratives of mining justiﬁcation
reveal the tools and terms used to persuade and prod investors,
the host country, the general public and potentially affected com-
munities to proceed with the extraction of coal. While not novel,
the ﬁssure between corporate and government energy claims and
ground agricultural realities is immense. Before moving on to dis-
cuss rapporteurs and human rights, the extent of the Phulbari mine
will be reviewed.Voices of contestation and justiﬁcation
Unprecedented impacts are projected for the $1.1 billion Phul-
bari proposal to extract 16 million tons of coal from northwest
Bangladesh. Phulbari represents the only project for the British
company, Global Coal Management Resources plc (GCM) (formerly
Asia Energy). As a result, GCM lacks experience in undertaking an
intricate, long-term mining operation (Moody, 2008). To assume
a company with no demonstrated track record in implementing
complex mineral extraction projects will proceed without
challenges is naive. Delayed for several years following agitations,
80% of the 6000 hectares required for the open-pit mine is
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UN rapporteurs estimate the mine’s impacts to be more extensive,
including the immediate displacement of 50,000 to 130,000 peo-
ple, and the further displacement of 220,000 as irrigation channels
and wells dry up. The rapporteurs further that extraction of coal
will ruin 12,000 hectares of fertile agricultural land, while disrupt-
ing the clean water supply of 220,000 people (Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a,b).
The scale of the project and associated food, water and liveli-
hood implications for a large number of people drive local, national
and international opposition to the Phulbari mine. During resis-
tance to the coal project in August 2006, Bangladesh defense forces
ﬁred on and killed three protestors, and wounded over three hun-
dred people out of a crowd of 70,000 people. A Phulbari leader
describes, ‘‘three young lives were sacriﬁced for the sake of our
whole community’s right to live on our lands’’ (Luthfa, 2011: 10).
The mine came to a halt during emergency rule in early 2007.
The mine proposal comes at a time when the contemporary
political economy of Bangladesh is in ﬂux and characterized by vio-
lence (Feldman and Geisler, 2012: 971). With high population den-
sity, high agricultural employment dependence and shrinking
arable land, Bangladesh provides an important contribution to
the land and food debates (Feldman and Geisler, 2012: 973).
Despite land reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, poor peasants pre-
dominantly do not enjoy the beneﬁts of formal rights to state lands
(Adnan, 2013: 101–102). This may be attributed to uneven access
to and ownership of agricultural lands. Although 50 percent of
rural households are landless, land reforms and improvements in
agricultural productivity in Bangladesh are hindered by the ‘‘distri-
bution of power between factions engaged in primitive accumula-
tion’’ (Khan, 2004: 77).
Related dispossession exacerbates food challenges for the
nation’s poor. While the constitution of Bangladesh guarantees
that the state is responsible for ensuring that citizens have access
to basic necessities, including access to food, major obstacles make
affordable and accessible food unattainable for much of the popu-
lation (Shahabuddin, 2010). Persistent poverty and malnutrition
are enduring issues for the nation, where half of the population
cannot afford adequate food for basic nourishment (Shahabuddin,
2010: 117). Beyond agriculture, the Phulbari project poses further
challenges in Bangladesh, a country with a limited regulatory envi-
ronment and a bad environmental track record (Moody, 2008: 4).
The issue of energy security is a critical component of the state
promotion of coal extraction. The government is preoccupied with
efforts to secure energy, including electricity to meet individual
and commercial needs. While 41% of the country has electricity,
95.7 million people remain without access (International Energy
Agency, 2011).Newspaces and formsof energyextraction inBangla-
desh alter national energy debates, and provide a new landscape for
CSR intersections. CSR is a common tool transnationally, but related
narratives and ‘‘community engagements’’ are new to the extractive
industry in Bangladesh (Gardner, 2012). As a result, there may be a
range of ways that impacted people perceive and experience pro-
posed and actual development beneﬁts associated with extraction.
Aspirations of economic and social transformation among commu-
nities living in poverty are exempliﬁed in Northeast Bangladesh.
Gardner (2012: 3) notes how one resident living close to a proposed
natural gas ﬁeld expressed that, ‘‘under our ﬁelds is gold’’. Diverse
expectations and experiences with extraction exemplify the com-
plexity associated with development and mining.
An expert committee reviewed the feasibility of coal extraction
in Bangladesh in 2012, and recommended open-pit extraction at
Phulbari to meet national energy demand. Government statements
emphasize the importance of extraction, but do not explicitly
state the role of the corporate promoter in the process. Rather,government statements demonstrate determination to move for-
ward with nationally led coal extraction. Dr. Tawﬁq-e-Elawi
Chowdury, the Prime Minister’s Power and Energy Advisor, high-
lighted the importance of generating in-country studies and
approaches on coal mining as, ‘‘national interests cannot be
ensured by a foreign company’’ (Jahangir, 2012). In place of incom-
plete assessments from the company, the ‘‘Institute of Water Mod-
elling will conduct the survey ﬁrst and then the government would
determine the coal-extraction method’’ (Jahangir, 2012). The coun-
try held national elections in January 2014, marked by low turnout
and violence. The shifting political context may also alter the gov-
ernment’s approach to the Phulbari project.
The dynamic political landscape and recent government state-
ments generate ambiguity about the status of the project. When
GCM reinvigorated government interest in the mine following Ban-
gladesh elections in late 2008, a number of competing voices
entered the scene. In an unexpected turn, WikiLeaks cables docu-
mented that the former United States (US) Ambassador to Bangla-
desh, James Moriarty, urged the nation’s chief energy advisor, Dr.
Chowdhury, to approve the project as ‘‘open-pit mining seemed
the best way forward’’ (Karim, 2010). Citing US ﬁnancial links to
the mining company, Moriarty noted that ‘‘Asia Energy, the com-
pany behind the Phulbari project, has sixty percent US investment’’
(Karim, 2010). This diplomatic intervention, unwittingly revealed
to the public, provides insight to the range of pressures for the gov-
ernment to pursue or stop the project.
On August 26, 2012, thousands gathered with the main oppo-
sition movement to call on the government to cancel the Phulbari
mining project. The day annually serves to commemorate those
killed in the 2006 agitation, and is referred to as ‘Phulbari Day’
by those opposing the mine. The rally leaders threatened a more
intensive protests if the government did not ban the method of
open coal mining proposed for Phulbari (Daily Star, 2012). Anti-
mining activists call for ‘‘a moratorium on foreign companies,
the method of open-cast mining and the export of coal (bide-
shi na, unmukto na, raptani na)’’ (Chowdury, 2012: 23). Continued
political uncertainty and agitation makes it unclear whether the
mine will proceed, despite strong diplomatic connections of the
corporate promoter.
Further government interventions on behalf of the corporation
came to light during Parliamentary questions in the United King-
dom (UK). The Minister for International Development and Minis-
ter for Business, Gareth Thomas, detailed how the British High
commission in Bangladesh advocated on behalf of the corporation’s
proposed mine:
We have provided support to Global Coal Management
Resources PLC, through the British high commission in Dhaka.
They have lobbied to ensure that the Government of Bangladesh
take the company’s interests into consideration and do not pro-
hibit opencast mining. The British high commission will con-
tinue to remain in touch with the company and will represent
their interests as appropriate. The Bangladeshi Caretaker Gov-
ernment’s new draft coal policy leaves the way open for open-
cast mining in Bangladesh in the future.
[House of Lords. House of Commons, 2009]
The above revelations expose the range of voices seeking to
inﬂuence the Bangladesh government to support the mine. Further
voices complicate the portrayal of the mine as a positive step, and
broaden the terrain for understanding the layers of corporate inter-
ventions and contestations. Nationally, the narrative of protest
highlights the injustices associated with the energy justiﬁcations
of the project. The organization responsible for much of the
nation-wide protests against Phulbari, the National Committee to
Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, highlights
252 H.P. Bedi / Geoforum 59 (2015) 248–257that 80% of the energy from the project will be exported to India,
rather than used domestically. While one of the regions, Birampur,
where the mine is proposed shares a border with India, the
National Committee details that the coal would be transported
via the ecologically sensitive UNESCO world heritage Sundarbans
region, and ultimately transferred to the Indian state of Odisha
by sea (Interview, January 2014). Their resistance directly critiques
the energy justiﬁcations for coal extraction furthered by govern-
ment ofﬁcials.
Dr. Samina Luthfa, an activist scholar at Dhaka University
describes how protest narratives in the proposedmine area include
agriculture, land, livelihoods and culture themes. Potentially
affected and displaced peoples do not frame agriculture in relation
to human rights. Rather, potentially project affected persons
emphasize the high agricultural productivity in the region. In
defending the area against the project, local people described
how they are the granary of Bangladesh, providing most of the
country’s rice, explains Luthfa. They explain how there is 200% crop
intensity in the area, with three crops grown per year. While these
concerns have clear linkages to the right to food agenda, the
human rights terms are not evoked locally.
In addition to local and national actors disputing the mine,
international non-governmental organizations act to halt the mine.
A recent submission by the World Development Movement to the
UK Parliament regarding the Phulbari mine reﬂects the contradic-
tions associated with the work of the British High Commission. ‘‘A
British company is pursuing a project overseas with large human
rights implications and no scrutiny by authorities in the UK. More-
over, the UK government has been lobbying in Bangladesh for the
mine to go ahead, even though it has not investigated the implica-
tions of the mine for local people’’ (House of Lords. House of
Commons, 2009: EV 136).
Civil society allegations of human rights inconsistencies were
recently elevated through a formal dispute process of the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD,
2013). The OECD, which is comprised of 34 nations, promotes
‘‘policies that will improve the economic and social well-being
of people around the world’’ and helps these nations consider
the ‘‘environmental implications of social and economic develop-
ment’’ (OECD, 2013). The organization provides evidence-based
reviews of corporate behavior in relation to the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises through a formal complaint process.
In 2011, the guidelines were revised to include a new chapter on
human rights. This addition provides a hook for advocacy organi-
zations demanding human rights accountability from corpora-
tions based in OECD member countries. The OECD does not
accept all complaints for investigation, with only about half for-
mally registered as complaints (Interview, December 2013). Fol-
lowing research and conversations with the involved company
and accuser, in certain cases the OECD makes a formal statement
on the issue.
In June 2013, the UK National Contact Point for the OECD for-
mally accepted a complaint on GCM’s Phulbari mine project sub-
mitted by two non-governmental organizations, the International
Accountability Project and the World Development Movement.
Currently, the OECD is investigating the complainants’ assertions
that the:
open cast mine planned by GCM will necessarily adversely
affect human rights by displacing large numbers of people,
including indigenous communities, destroying the basis of their
subsistence and livelihoods, and having widespread, severe and
lasting impacts on the local environment, food security and
water supply for the population in a large area surrounding
the mine.
[Murdoch et al., 2013: 3]The review does not presume that ‘‘the NCP considers the com-
pany has acted inconsistently with the Guidelines’’ (Murdoch et al.,
2013: 3). It does acknowledge that guideline violations may have
happened, and as a result caught the attention of GCM sharehold-
ers and investors. A ﬁnancial news organization noted that the
‘‘acceptance of the complaints by OECD for investigation into the
alleged human rights violations at Phulbari coalmine site dealt a
serious blow to GCM’’ (Ahmed, 2013). Following these recent set-
backs, the company began the process of scaling down their oper-
ations in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2013).
The above narratives afﬁrming or questioning mining do not
form in silos, but instead are informed by one another and the
broader national and international contexts for human rights.
The landscape for the mine changed when a set of UN actors ampli-
ﬁed concerns over the project, demonstrating the growing use of
human rights as a tool of contention. In the following section, the
UN human rights system, including the role of the rapporteurs, is
reviewed and problematized. The rapporteurs selectively critique
corporate or state activities with human rights implications. A brief
background to the rapporteurs will be followed by analysis of their
statement on Phulbari.
Mandate of UN special rapporteurs
‘‘The Government of Bangladesh must ensure that any policy
concerning open-pit coal mining includes robust safeguards to
protect human rights. In the interim, the Phulbari coal mine
should not be allowed to proceed because of the massive dis-
ruptions it is expected to cause’’.
[Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a]
In 2012, a group of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs
issued a stern statement regarding potential human rights viola-
tions associated with the Phulbari coal mine, including the above
statement. Through this act, they became the latest actors to enter
the land, food and energy debate. Their contribution is quite
unique, as they are not brokering or encouraging the deal. Instead,
they are questioning it using a human rights framework. The rap-
porteurs represent one aspect of a broader UN system dedicated to
human rights, however in practice their impact is unclear.
Although the UN made early advances in deﬁning and spread-
ing notions of human rights, it has proved unable to meaningfully
advance the struggle for the universal protection of rights (Dudai,
2007: 1261). Despite a plethora of human rights conventions, trea-
ties, rapporteurs and ofﬁcial statements or declarations of con-
demnation, global abuses of fundamental rights endure. The
same fate plagues the rapporteurs and broader Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights who assist, ‘‘but their potential
to achieve policy changes in the monitored countries is limited;
when a political window of opportunity is opened, the UN human
rights machinery can step in and contribute to the process, but it is
rarely able to bring about political change by itself’’ (Dudai, 2007:
1261).
The rapporteur process and the individuals associated with the
program are not uncontentious. Civil-society organizations critique
the politicization of the rapporteur appointment process (Pinheiro,
2003: 7-8). Because their access is dependent on host countries,
their engagements can be problematic. Rapporteurs have the
opportunity to ‘‘serve as voices for the voiceless and as spokesper-
sons for the victims, but (their) our effectiveness depends on main-
taining a dialogue with host countries and concerned capitals
around the world’’ (Pinheiro, 2003: 10).
Despite political and procedural limitations that mitigate
against rapporteurs, incremental changes and pressure frommulti-
ple angles may heighten awareness of human rights issues. Rap-
porteurs ‘‘may not produce immediate changes, but they do
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parency and accountability’’ (Pinheiro, 2003: 12-13). Speciﬁcally,
their reports ask governments to respond to alleged human rights
violations and provide the opportunity for alternatives to be pro-
posed. While they lack formal power, they nonetheless can elevate
a human rights cause to the international stage.
Food as a fundamental right?
Undergirding the human rights system is the issue of food inse-
curity, which is contested conceptually. In 2012, seven UN rappor-
teurs, including the rapporteur for the right to food, used the term
food insecurity to describe the risks for the 40,000 people impacted
by the proposed Phulbari mine in Bangladesh. While there are a
multitude of food security deﬁnitions (Maxwell, 1996), I will focus
on the UN deﬁnitions to contextualize how the rapporteurs evoke
food insecurity, as their use of food insecurity terminology draws
from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The term
was originally coined during the food crises of the 1970s around
ideas of price and production stability. The 1974 World Food Sum-
mit deﬁned food security in relation to the supply of food:
Availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic
foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption
and to offset ﬂuctuations in production and prices.
[Food and Agricultural Organization, 2003: 27]
The 1983 FAO food security deﬁnition expanded to incorporate
the ability of vulnerable populations to access food, recognizing
that availability of food alone does not ensure that the most vul-
nerable receive physical and economic access to available food
(Maxwell, 1996). Following subsequent reinterpretations of the
concept, the FAO rebranded food security in 2001 to reﬂect a range
of socio-economic issues, preferences and healthy living outlined
in The State of Food Insecurity:
Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufﬁcient,
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life.
[Food and Agricultural Organization, 2003]
Patel (2009: 664) critiques the latest FAO deﬁnition, as it fails to
address by whom and how the food system is controlled and ulti-
mately is ‘‘both a cause and consequence of its increasing irrele-
vance as a guiding concept in the shaping of international food
production and consumption priorities’’. The politically neutral
idea of the recent deﬁnition of food security allows states to
side-step speciﬁc food commitments without domestic accessibil-
ity and accountability. This approach further does not acknowledge
that a small minority structure our food system, so ‘‘to talk of a
right to shape food policy is to contrast with a privilege’’ (Patel,
2009: 667). More recently, the idea of food sovereignty is encour-
aged as a more holistic approach to food issues recognizing the
importance of who controls the food system and the broader polit-
ical system within which it is embedded. La via Campesina, an
international peasant movement, noted that food sovereignty is a
precursor to food security, and in 1996 afﬁrmed that ‘‘food is a
basic human right’’ (La Via Campesina, 1996).3 Though not yet fully
enshrined, this movement shows the ways that the right to food is
evoked, but not agreed upon.3 In the 2007 Declaration of Nyéléni, La via Campesina deﬁned food sovereignty as
‘‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to deﬁne their own food
and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food a
the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and
corporations’’ (La Via Campesina, 2007).,
tFood insecurity, food sovereignty and the right to food are dis-
tinct concepts, and yet at times they can be on a continuum or con-
ﬂated. The use of food insecurity in the Phulbari mining
condemnation statement reﬂects the position of the UN afﬁliation
of the rapporteurs, while they also maintain their individual of
roles as rapporteurs representing various human rights. Olivier
De Schutter, the current UN right to food rapporteur, explicitly
links land access and livelihoods to the fundamental guaranteed
to the right to food. De Schutter earlier explained his position on
this matter:
The human right to food would be violated if people depending
on land for their livelihoods, including pastoralists, were cut off
from access to land, without suitable alternatives; if local
incomes were insufﬁcient to compensate for the price effects
resulting from the shift towards the production of food for
exports; or if the revenues of local smallholders were to fall fol-
lowing the arrival on domestic markets of cheaply priced food,
produced on the more competitive large-scale plantations
developed thanks to the arrival of the investor.
[De Schutter, 2009: 3]
Globally, of the estimated 925 million people categorized as
food insecure, nearly half depend on subsistence agriculture and
are plagued by land loss, poor soil, or lack of irrigation (De
Schutter, 2011: 256). Drawing from broader concerns of food inse-
curity, the rapporteur statement frames the Phulbari mining pro-
ject and associated land grabbing and food implications to a
range of human rights violations. The use of the right to food trope
derives from the growing prominence of the right to food agenda in
development, and from the regional changes in right to food legis-
lation. For example, India passed the National Food Security Act in
2013, which recognizes the right to food and provides grain subsi-
dies for two-thirds of the nation’s population. The Right to Food
Campaign India (2013) led the struggle for the legislation to
respect that, ‘‘everyone has a fundamental right to be free from
hunger and under-nutrition. Realizing this right requires not only
equitable and sustainable food systems, but also entitlements
relating to livelihood security such as the right to work, land
reform and social security’’ (Right to Food Campaign India, 2013).
The government of Bangladesh has not adopted right to food legis-
lation, although there are national programs to address persistent
food insecurity and mechanisms to address food challenges during
natural disasters (Shahabuddin, 2010: 128).
The seven UN rapporteurs representing the right to food, right
to safe drinking water and sanitation, right to adequate housing,
indigenous peoples, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom
of peaceful assembly and of association, extreme poverty and
human rights issued a statement criticizing the Phulbari mine.
While it is not unusual for statements to be co-authored by multi-
ple experts, the range of rapporteurs included in this condemna-
tion displays the extent of potential violations associated with
the mine. The main themes highlighted by the rapporteurs include
food insecurity, water insecurity, displacement and indigenous
rights and the right to democratic dissent.
A critical aspect of the statement focuses on potential food inse-
curity, as the project is proposed for Bangladesh’s most productive
agricultural region. The argument centers on the importance of
subsistence farming for Bangladesh, and responsibilities to protect
the right to food. De Schutter, notes that ‘‘nearly half the Banglade-
shi population is food insecure, and nearly one quarter severely
food insecure. Local food production should be strengthened,
not sacriﬁced for industrial projects’’ (Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a).
For Phulbari, the rapporteurs warn that entire indigenous hab-
itations, including the villages of Santal, Munda, Mahili and Pahan
will be affected (Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human
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off from their livelihoods, commercial interactions and community
connections (Cernea, 2000: 23). Further, development related dis-
placement is proven to lead to impoverishment and enduring com-
munity and environmental challenges (World Bank, 2001: 1). The
potential impact of such displacement can be severe:
The displacement of small-scale farmers from the lands they
depend on would further worsen the situation of a group, rep-
resenting between 1.5 and 2 billion people worldwide, which
is already marginalized, and which represents up to half of
the people who are too poor to feed themselves.
[De Schutter, 2011: 259]
The experts note that entire indigenous habitations, including
the villages of Santal, Munda, Mahili and Pahan will be affected
(Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a). Such
land alienation leaves people increasingly cut off from their liveli-
hoods, commercial interactions and community connections
(Cernea, 2000: 23). Further, development related displacement is
proven to lead to impoverishment and enduring community and
environmental challenges (World Bank, 2001: 1). De Schutter pre-
viously detailed the potential impact of such displacement:
The displacement of small-scale farmers from the lands they
depend on would further worsen the situation of a group, rep-
resenting between 1.5 and 2 billion people worldwide, which
is already marginalized, and which represents up to half of
the people who are too poor to feed themselves.
[De Schutter, 2011: 259]
The rapporteurs estimate that the project will ‘‘displace hun-
dreds of thousands of people and lead to the violation of funda-
mental human rights’’ (Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 2012a). This language forces awareness that
displacement is a rights concern, and that there should be consid-
eration for both in situ and ex situ project related displacement. In
situ displacement does not occur directly at the onset of the pro-
ject, but instead could be characterized by a lengthy dispossession
over time (Feldman and Geisler, 2012: 971). In contrast, ex situ
displacement involved the immediate extraction of people from
their land, homes and livelihoods (Feldman and Geisler, 2012:
971). The unequivocal use of language about a range of displace-
ments and impacts contrasts with corporate claims that the pro-
ject will impact a ﬁxed number of compensated people, when
the project is estimated to have residual impacts for years to come
as the water, soil and livelihood options in the region change
dramatically.
Underlying the food and displacement issues are apprehensions
about the lack of space for democratic dissent. Following the use of
violence and intimidation against protestors, the rapporteurs note
that prior, informed consent is vital and those impacted ‘‘must not
be intimidated out of exercising their rights to express their opin-
ions and peacefully assemble’’ (Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 2012a). The experts call on the government of
Bangladesh to integrate human rights principles in development
planning. Through this approach, they acknowledge that
democratic rights and space for dissent are prerequisites for the
protection of fundamental human rights. In conclusion, they note
that, ‘‘the Phulbari coal mine may entice developers. But for many
Bangladeshis the wholesale environmental degradation of the
Phulbari region will exacerbate food insecurity, poverty and
vulnerability to climate events for generations to come’’ (Ofﬁce
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a). Their state-
ment garnered international attention to the project, and the project
promoter felt compelled to publically contest their assertions.Flexible moralities and the limits of voluntary agreements
In response to the rapporteurs’ statement, the mine promoter
GCM Resources sent an open letter to De Schutter. GCM
(2012a,b) argued that their statement misrepresents the project’s
impacts and related corporate efforts to mitigate them. The corpo-
ration detailed that the UN experts do ‘‘not recognize the beneﬁts
that the Project will bring to the population of the country as a
whole and to the people of the Phulbari area’’ (GCM Resources,
2012a,b). The company stated that the project has ‘‘the potential
(and arguably an obligation) to enhance the human rights of the
people they affect’’ (GCM Resources, 2012a,b). It is noteworthy that
GCM uses the term ‘human rights’, but they fail to deﬁne it. This
leaves ambiguity regarding what rights and responsibilities they
invoke through their statement. It further provides the opportunity
for the company to frame human rights as aligned with their com-
mercial interests.
GCM argued that agricultural productivity will increase, which
they assert will stem from project-related year round irrigation
(GCM Resources, 2012a,b). However, the letter does not clarify
where people will be able to acquire new, fertile land for farming.
Following this assertion, we would do well to ask more about the
ways we theorize agricultural equity. Further, is the right to food
not symmetrical with marketplace driven models of economic
justiﬁcation?
The letter exposes ﬂaws in efforts to hold offending corpora-
tions accountable via nonbinding human rights standards. The
company applies language of rights without demonstrating how
their knowledge of the concept translates into the protection of
rights for people displaced or affected by the proposed mine. For
example, GCM highlights how all of their employees receive train-
ing in human rights (GCM Resources, 2012a,b). This training does
not translate into effective human rights practices. Further, the
company does not address the right to food concerns associated
with the mass displacement of people for the mine. Their state-
ment presumes that displacement is inevitable for commercial
promotion, while claiming that subsequent operations will be
aligned with a nebulous notion of human rights. The ﬁssure
between narratives of justiﬁcation and practice demonstrates that
for the corporation CSR is a ‘‘ritualized performance’’ (Dolan and
Rajak, 2011: 5). In effect, the adherence to human rights principles
appears to be more performative rather than substantive. Through
this logic, they fail to understand that the project associated ex situ
and in situ displacement and agricultural loss will fundamentally
deprive people of their right to food. This may be emblematic of
a broader tension associated with the corporate parameters of
social responsibility and the parameters of human rights activists.
Abstract human rights may be difﬁcult to put in action via a corpo-
rate intervention.
The company is a signatory of the UN Global Compact. Principle
Two of the Compact requires that corporations not be complicit in
human rights abuses. In the face of vast potential human rights
violations, GCM’s claims of global accountability highlight the lim-
itations of voluntary principles. A review of the project’s resettle-
ment plan reveals similar mis-steps. Written with the Asian
Development Bank (the Bank has since withdrawn from the pro-
ject), the resettlement plan acknowledges that both displaced
and host communities are concerned about their future ability to
farm. In response, the resettlement plan fails to address the chal-
lenge associated ﬁnding replacement fertile agrarian land for the
40,000 people proposed to be directly uprooted for the mine.
Instead, they offer compensation and claims of training without
stating whether the training will be linked to agriculture. For
example, in response to the reality that displacees expressed con-
cern about the ‘‘loss of agricultural land and the resultant negative
4 One corporate association that encourages voluntary CSR principles, the Inter-
national Council on Mines and Minerals, is challenged for generating pro-industry
knowledge and for ‘green-washing’ as a means to protect the ﬁnancial stability o
members (Bebbington et al., 2008: 904).
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project-affected persons will receive ‘‘compensation for all land
and asset losses’’ and ‘‘skills and training programs’’ (Asian
Development Bank and Asia Energy, 2006: 9–10). The corporation
avoids speciﬁcs on future resettlement and compensation plans as
the project evolves. They state:
The complexity of the Project, involving the acquisition of large
tracts of land and the resettlement of a substantial number of
households and business enterprises over a relatively long per-
iod, precludes the establishment of a ﬁxed blueprint. People’s
compensation and livelihood-earning preferences are bound
to change as they witness the implementation of mining and
resettlement activities, and as new opportunities emerge’’.
[Asian Development Bank and Asia Energy, 2006]
Corporations draw from speciﬁc models of progress which pre-
sume growth and particular ideas of development. They then legit-
imize extraction by attesting to promises of skills and training that
would presumably increase employability and ability to meet the
vision of emerging economies industrializing and turning low-
income agrarian economies into ‘modern’ middle class consumer
classes. This generic approach misses contextual and cultural dif-
ferences among those who would be impacted by mining.
The GCM documents adopt some language reﬂecting the needs
and interests of displacees, but their narrative clouds the chal-
lenges associated with loss of direct access to food and livelihood
resources. Historically, movements and communities contested
similar development induced injustices. However, the particular
conﬂuence of information and voices associated with lauding or
contesting the Phulbari mine highlights new actors and new access
to information through channels including Wikileaks. The infusion
of these voices complicates efforts to narrowly justify the mine
without clarity of the precise right to land and food claims
expressed by a range of actors. The Phulbari case demonstrates
limitations of voluntary principles, particularly given the inade-
quate framework for environmental regulation in Bangladesh.
Though GCM emphasized dialogue and voluntary action, their
CSR activities have shortcomings. Human rights are not require-
ments, but appear to be tokenistic gestures which offer legitimiza-
tion for corporate projects. Corporations have become increasingly
savvy in adopting CSR language and principles. The apparent main-
streaming of CSR needs to be continuously problematized, as some
free rider corporations may appropriate the language without
altering their practice. Caution is urged to avoid the indiscriminate
application of CSR in mining. This case alludes to the need for more
nuanced interrogations of the inevitable discrepancies between
CSR rhetoric and the diverse realities of CSR practice on the ground.
As with contextual diversity, there is a range of ways that different
corporations put their CSR into action, with some more tokenistic
than others. In response, we as researchers also need to study
the different interpretations and manifestations of standardized
CSR claims.
Voluntary principles legitimize processes that deserve exami-
nation. This case highlights the need to scrutinize mining practices
in light of CSR claims being voluntary and self-regulated.
Nonbinding corporate measures to ensure human rights or
social protections may not be sufﬁcient to meet demands from civil
society for accountability (Maassarani et al., 2007: 136). The exam-
ple of land grabbing demonstrates how voluntary principles nor-
malized the process of land deals, rather than providing a new
forum to fundamentally contest the acquisition of agricultural
land.
Borras and Franco (2012: 3) trace the ‘re-framing’ of land rights
when the International Food Policy Research Institute established
the need for a code of conduct for the practice in 2009 and theWorld Bank proposed Principles for Responsible Agricultural
Investment. These initiatives shift the focus from questioning the
acquisition of agricultural land, to accepting the mainstreaming
of land grabbing. In so doing, the process is set as ‘inevitable’ and
framed as a scenario where all ‘stakeholders’ can gain. Also, volun-
tary principles divert attention from concerns including ‘‘coming to
terms with how rural poor people’s land (and water) rights, inter-
ests and concerns must be prioritised and promoted, and not just
recognized and protected’’ (Borras and Franco, 2012: 3). This raises
broader questions about efforts for corporations to be capital-gen-
erating entities, while also promoting social responsibility.4
Theoretically, international principles promoting a range of fun-
damental rights are progressive steps, and some corporations rise
to the occasion. However, the potential good of principles is unrav-
eled by corporations such as GCM who use them as a shield to
guard themselves from meaningful changes on the ground. Propo-
nents of the UN Global Compact argue that calls for mandatory cri-
teria and independent monitoring of corporate activity push the
principles to fulﬁll a mandate contradictory to the ‘learning net-
work’ approach (Ruggie, 2002: 31). However, when such principles
provide authenticity to a process that is incongruent with protect-
ing the rights of those affected, there are severe implications.
While many corporations may proceed in good faith, there will
always be rogue companies that pursue their goals without con-
cern for undertaking real reform.
Recognizing that possible implementation of the Phulbari mine
would be complex and may lead to local ambiguity regarding
potential opportunities or challenges (Banks, 2006), the moral
implications remain theoretical while the mine is only proposed.
If the project were to proceed, the company would have the power
to make decisions that could directly impact people’s access to
food. ‘‘At a practical level (when stakeholder claims are deemed
to take precedence), the tension involves the ability of the ﬁrm’s
board and management to exercise their moral will to take deci-
sions that go against their interests (and those of shareholders)’’
(Kapelus, 2002: 290). GCM Resources adopts the appropriate lan-
guage to assume the moral high ground, but there is no guarantee
that food sovereignty will take precedence above and beyond com-
mitments to shareholders. CSR language provides a tool for the
company to clothe these intentions in narratives that have become
the mining industry standard.When not to mine?
The fate of the proposed Phulbari mine and those it would
impact is embedded in the broader Bangladesh context, including
the agricultural context and political response to the mine. While
transnational activism arguably ‘hollow(s) out’ the authority of
the state (Power, 2005: 20), in this case the policy choice of the
government will prove critical. The power of the range of voices
contesting the mine is dependent on how the Bangladesh govern-
ment balances human rights warnings with commercial interests,
energy security and diplomatic pressure. The Bangladesh govern-
ment did not issue a public response to the rapporteurs’ warning.
Through the OECD review, it came to light from the UN’s Special
Procedures Committee that ‘‘rapporteurs are awaiting a substan-
tive response from the Government of Bangladesh on the issues’’
(Murdoch et al., 2013: 10). The rapporteurs further ‘‘welcome
Prime Minister Hasina’s acknowledgement that coal extraction in
Bangladesh would threaten densely populated areas’’, but note that
‘‘mixed messages, however, are emerging and investors continuef
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Rights, 2012a). They seem to allude to GCM Resources’ February
1, 2012 report which claimed that they are engaged with govern-
ment discussions ‘‘that would strengthen the Phulbari proposition’’
(Jackson, 2012). The WikiLeaks cable revealed that following his
meeting with the US Ambassador, the Prime Minister’s energy
advisor agreed to encourage the project via parliamentary process
(Karim, 2010). There is also speculation that the corporation will
provide the government with a 30% stake in the project (Ahmed,
2013).
The successful articulation of agrarian and food grievances
framing human rights varies greatly in relation to the issue, con-
text and legal frameworks for resistance (Monsalve Suarez, 2012:
10). In this example, though diverse actors represent layering of
narratives inﬂuencing the Phulbari mine decision, there are still
important voices missing from the scope of the article. Future
ﬁeld-work will explore the evocations of mining critiques from
communities and political parties in Bangladesh. Empirical engage-
ment in the proposed mine area will reveal the distinct ways that
mining proposals are experienced and contested. There remains
ambiguity regarding the project’s economic potential, and further
interviews will potentially cast light on the mixed impressions or
conceptualizations of mining.
The diverse interpretations and use of human rights narratives
expose the challenges associated with voluntary corporate princi-
ples, which incorporate legally mandated human rights
(Stephens, 2002: 80). The UN Global Compact is used strategically
by GCM Resources to legitimize their mining proposal as in accor-
dance with international best practice. However, this voluntary
corporate regulation lacks a mechanism to legally verify or bind
member corporations to UN enshrined human rights, including
the right to food. As a result, corporations have extensive opportu-
nity and ability to frame their projects in a manner that is most
beneﬁcial towards their amoral pursuit of proﬁt. In relation to
UK companies, the World Development Movement noted in evi-
dence given to the UK Parliament that Phulbari demonstrates ‘‘that
there needs to be greater regulation of corporate activity by the UK
government, rather than the government acting purely on behalf of
UK business’’ (House of Lords. House of Commons, 2009: EV 135).
The UN rapporteurs occupy an unusual perch to question min-
eral extraction, and openly critique corporate and state practices
which threaten the right to food and other human rights. Their
activism represents the power of actors beyond the state to make
claims about voluntary rights principles, beyond the scope of
national regulation. In concert with local and national critiques,
condemnation from the rapporteurs re-politicizes what is often a
de-politicized space for companies to make CSR claims which do
not recognize contextual power relations and unevenness. This
reveals the dynamic nature of the terrain for promoting or contest-
ing extraction. The narratives respond to or are inﬂuenced by the
panoply of actors involved, and in reﬂection of changes in the con-
text for the mine proposal. Collectively, these diverse actors repre-
sent the layering of voices weighing in on mineral extraction and
associated right to food concerns.
The layered narratives and interpretations of the right to food
represent a new terrain for the promotion and contestation of min-
ing. It is nascent for a few distinct reasons. First, access to diplo-
matic information is increasingly made public through channels
such as Wikileaks. Second, UN rapporteurs are a relatively new
set of actors with the capacity to amplify rights concerns globally.
Third, new government efforts to question corporate ethics, includ-
ing those by the UK Parliament, reﬂect growing public interest in
corporate accountability and transparency within and beyond
national boundaries. Fourth, the relatively new OECD human rights
review of corporate practice in relation to the Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises provides an alternate forum to elevate civilsociety or movement claims of human rights violations. Despite
the range of voices altering the terrain for mining implementation
or contestation, the stark reality remains that when the economic
bottom line remains the main corporate driver, corporate amoral-
ity and lack of binding commitments permit human rights viola-
tions in the pursuit of mineral extraction and energy security.
Both CSR and voluntary standards attempt to mitigate the
potential negative impacts of corporate interventions. While there
is merit in the impetus behind such efforts, in practice the imple-
mentation appears to be a ‘‘one size ﬁts all’’ approach to addressing
social, economic and environmental change associated with
extractive industries, without clear guidance for turning rhetoric
into meaningful practice appropriate to distinct contexts. As a
result, generic implementation across diverse places can prove
problematic and inappropriate for particular settings. Mining is
necessary to sustain humans on earth, but are there particular
places where the social and environmental consequences are too
great, even if the company adopts CSR narratives? Moody (2007)
suggests that there are places that should not be mined because
of the grave risks associated with extraction, and that the mining
‘‘industry’’ is not in a position to be entrusted with these decisions.
Moving away from legitimizing narratives as a solution to any pro-
posed extraction to this form of baseline questioning would depo-
liticize the economic, energy and/or CSR justiﬁcations for projects
such as Phulbari.
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